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Abstract
This paper examines competition in the standard one-dimensional Downsian model of
two-candidate elections, but where one candidate (A) enjoys an advantage over the other
candidate (D). Voters' preferences are Euclidean, but any voter will vote for candidate
A over candidate D unless D is closer to her ideal point by some xed distance . The
location of the median voter's ideal point is uncertain, and its distribution is commonly
known by both candidates. The candidates simultaneously choose locations to maximize
the probability of victory. Pure strategy equilibria often fails to exist in this model, except
under special conditions about  and the distribution of the median ideal point. We solve
for the essentially unique symmetric mixed equilibrium, show that candidate A adopts
more moderate policies than candidate D, and obtain some comparative statics results
about the probability of victory and the expected distance between the two candidates'
policies.
JEL classication numbers: C72, D72
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Mixed Equilibrium in a Downsian Model with a
Favored Candidate

Enriqueta Aragones Thomas R. Palfrey
1 Introduction
Often the media tells us about Candidate So-and-so's charisma, hand-shaking skill, great
speech delivery, or lack thereof. Yet only rarely do these features nd leading roles in the
simple spatial models that political scientists have embraced as the tool of choice to study
candidate competition in mass elections. This paper takes the simplest non-trivial exten-
sion of the standard Downsian model in this direction, and explores the implications for
the equilibrium positioning of candidates. With this seemingly trivial addition of realism
into the model things seem to change very dramatically. Pure strategy equilibria fail to
exist even in a single dimension where voters have single-peaked preferences. Candidates
diverge, and this divergence occurs in predictable ways. Candidates with charisma end
up reinforcing their advantage by adopting relatively more centrist platforms on average,
while the ugly, clumsy, and inarticulate ounder on the periphery of the policy space.
The implications of our model are actually more general than simply an investigation
of the eects of charisma, or other \exogenous" candidate characteristics. The results
apply for any particular non-policy advantage one candidate has over another, which
is valued by all voters. Thus, endogenous political phenomena such as oce holding
experience, incumbent performance, constituency service, and advertising (campaign ex-
penditures) can also generate similar eects. Because these advantages or disadvantages
can arise for either endogenous or exogenous reasons, we lump all of them together and
simply view these eects as \image". In addition to the candidate-specic image dimen-
sion, there are also broader \valence" issues (Stokes, 1963, pp. 170-4), such as economic
performance (Kiewiet 1983) and military success, that are irreversibly linked to a candi-
date through his or her party's past and current performance. There is ample evidence
that such issues are very important in elections, and such factors need to be incorporated
into the standard models. To wit:
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It will not do simply to exclude valence issues from the discussion of party
competition. The people's choice too often depends upon them. At least in
American presidential elections of the past generation it is remarkable how
many valence issues have held the center stage. (Stokes, 1963, p. 171)
More recently, Popkin et al. (1976) come to a similar conclusion about the 1972 U.S.
election: \[The voter] cares less about which candidate is the closest to his ideal position
on issues for which he has information and preferences, but cares most about which
candidate can deliver the most" (p. 793). Since we nd here that even small asymmetries
along the image dimension or divergent voter perceptions of candidate competence on
valence issues can generate signicant electoral eects in equilibrium, this may help
explain why empirical studies in political science often nd these kinds of eects play
important roles in campaigns, candidate entry decisions (Banks and Kiewiet 1989), and
incumbent longevity (Kiewiet and Zeng 1993).
There are several recent papers that have begun to investigate the theoretical prop-
erties of equilibrium in the presence of candidate image eects. The closest are An-
solabehere and Snyder (2000) and Groseclose (1999).
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Those papers investigate dierent
variations of the model we study in this paper, and they focus only on pure strategy
equilibria. Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000) focus on candidates that maximize the prob-
ability of winning in a world of certainty. They nd that, when a pure strategy equilib-
rium exists, the advantaged candidate locates centrally, and there is no restriction on the
location of the disadvantaged candidate (who always loses). In Groseclose, candidates
have policy preferences of their own, which are suciently weighted in their objective
function to guarantee pure strategy equilibria. Policy preferences of sucient magni-
tude can overcome the problem of nonexistence of pure strategy equilibrium (Groseclose
1999). If two candidates maximize expected vote (or probability of winning, when the
median voter's location is random) and are purely oce-motivated, then pure strategy
equilibrium fails to exist except in uninteresting boundary cases, such as when there is no
uncertainty.
2
This result is indeed very general, covering rather arbitrary policy spaces.
The intuition is simple. The advantaged candidate wins all the votes if he exactly copies
the location of the disadvantaged candidate. Thus, the disadvantaged candidate must
mix in order not to be predictable. However, in order for mixing to be optimal for the
disadvantaged candidate, the advantaged candidate also must be mixing.
Several other papers have examined formal models of candidate equilibria where there
are asymmetries between the candidates. Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) and Berger,
Munger, and Pottho (2000) look at incumbency advantages, and explore equilibria when
candidates locate sequentially. Londregan and Romer (1993) also look at competition
with incumbency eects. Wittman (2000) adopts a sequential location approach, in a
model that looks at the role of pressure groups. Sequential approaches like these avoid
1
These papers were brought to our attention after we had obtained the main results presented in this
paper.
2
Indeed, this has been known for a long time, and Groseclose (1999) quite correctly refers to it as a
folk theorem.
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the nonexistence problem of simultaneous location choice, but leave open the question
of what is the correct sequential model, which can be problematic since results typically
depend on order of moves.
None of the above papers investigates the properties of the mixed strategy equilibria
of the simultaneous location game. That is what we do in this paper. In section 2
we present the basic model, where the policy space is a nite grid of points on the
[0; 1] interval, voters have Euclidean preferences, the location of the median voter's ideal
point is uncertain, and candidates choose policies to maximize probability of winning.
In section 3 we solve for closed form solutions of mixed strategy equilibrium when the
size of the advantage enjoyed by one candidate is relatively small. It turns out that the
solutions are slightly dierent depending on whether the policy space consists of an even
or an odd number points, so we analyze the two cases separately. The basic techniques
in the two cases are similar, so we only include the analysis of the even case in the
body of the paper. The odd case is treated in an appendix, where we also prove that
the two solutions converge when the policy space grid becomes ne. In section 4, we
analyze the properties of the equilibrium found in the previous section for large n: We
compare the expected payos of the two candidates, and look at limiting cases, in which
the advantage is arbitrarily small and the policy space grid approaches a continuum. We
nd that the advantaged candidate always has a higher expected payo in equilibrium,
but this equilibrium advantage shrinks to zero in the limit. In section 5 we explore three
dierent extensions of the model: non-uniform distributions of the median voter's ideal
point, larger values of the advantage, and existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium in
the case of continuous locations. We conclude in section 6.
2 The Model
The policy space, }, is the set of n points on the [0; 1] interval, x
i
=
i 1
n 1
, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n.
There are two candidates, A and D, who are referred to as the advantaged candidate and
the disadvantaged candidate, respectively. Each candidate's objective is to maximize his
probability of winning the election. Each voter has a utility function, with two compo-
nents, a policy component, and a candidate image component.
3
The policy component
is characterized by an ideal point in the policy space }, with utility of alternatives in
the policy space a strictly decreasing function of the Euclidean distance between the
ideal point and the location of the policy, symmetric around the ideal point. We assume
there exists a unique median location, denoted by x
m
. Candidates do not know x
m
, but
share a common prior belief about it. This commonly shared belief is represented by a
probability distribution over }, and is denoted by a vector of probabilities, (
1
; : : : ; 
n
),
where 
i
 0, i = 1; 2; : : : ; n and 
1
+ : : : + 
n
= 1: We denote by m the median of the
distribution . The image component is captured by an additive constant to the utility
a voter gets if A wins the election. That is, the utility that a voter with ideal point x
i
obtains if A wins the election is U
i
(x
A
) =    jx
i
  x
A
j and his utility if candidate D
3
There could be either a nite number of voters or a continuum.
3
wins is U
i
(x
D
) =   jx
i
  x
D
j ; where candidates' policy positions are denoted by x
A
and
x
B
, the size of A's advantage is   0:
4
The game takes place in two stages. In the rst stage, candidates simultaneously
choose positions in }. In the second stage, each voter votes for the candidate whose
election would give him the higher utility. In case of indierence, a voter is assumed to
vote for each candidate with probability equal to 1=2.
5
Since the behavior of the voters is unambiguous in this model, we dene an equilibrium
of the game only in terms of the location strategies of the two candidates in the rst
round. A pure strategy equilibrium is a pair of candidate locations, (x
A
; x
D
) such that
both candidates are maximizing the probability of winning, given the choices of the
other candidate. We denote by 
A
(x
A
; x
D
) and 
D
(x
A
; x
D
) the probability of winning
for candidate A and for candidate D, respectively, as a function of (x
A
; x
D
).
6
A mixed
strategy equilibrium is a pair of probability distributions over }, (
A
; 
D
), such that there
is no mixed strategy for A that guarantees higher probability of winning than 
A
, given

D
and there is no mixed strategy for D that guarantees higher probability of winning
than 
D
, given 
A
.
3 Derivation of Mixed equilibrium
For the rest of this section, we consider only small values of , such that 0   <
1
n 1
.
This simplies the derivation of equilibrium considerably. In the last section, we consider
what happens for larger values of . When  = 0, neither candidate has an advantage,
and we are in the standard Downsian world. In this case, when the distribution  has
a unique median, the two candidates both locate at the median m. The two candidates
each win with probability :5. Otherwise, there are multiple equilibria because there is
no unique median location. All of these equilibria involve the two candidates mixing
between the two median locations. As is evident from this, the even and odd cases will
have to be treated separately for the case of  > 0: When 0 <  <
1
n 1
, candidate A wins
if and only if the ideal point of the median voter is at least as close to A as to B. If B
is strictly closer to the median voter's ideal point than is A, then B wins.
First we state a version of a simple result that has also been established elsewhere.
7
4
Two natural generalization of this model would be: (1) to allow dierent candidates to have dif-
ferent beliefs about x; or (2) to allow dierent voters to have dierent image terms. Here we assume
homogeneity among voters and among candidates.
5
All our results would still hold if indierent voters vote with any arbitrary probability for each
candidate.
6
This model is formally equivalent to one in which there are n voters with Euclidean preferences,
whose ideal points are equally spaced along the unit interval, there is no uncertainty, and candidates
maximize expected vote.
7
Groseclose (1999) refers to this as a \folk theorem," and asserts that its proof has been known for
a long time. Dierent versions of this theorem can be found in Ansolobehere and Snyder (1999) and
Berger, Munger, and Pottho (1999).
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There is never an equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proposition 1: If 0 <  <
1
n 1
and n > 1, then there does not exist a pure strategy
equilibrium.
Proof : Suppose that (x
A
; x
D
) were an equilibrium. If x
A
= x
D
, then 
D
(x
A
; x
D
) = 0.
Since n > 1, there exists some x 6= x
D
, and 
D
(x
A
; x) 
1
n
> 
D
(x
A
; x
D
), so it must be
that x
A
6= x
D
. But if x
A
6= x
D
, then 
A
(x
A
; x
D
) 
n 1
n
< 1 = 
D
(x
D
; x
D
), so (x
A
; x
D
) is
not an equilibrium. 
The intuition is simple. If the disadvantaged candidate's location is perfectly pre-
dictable, the advantaged candidate can copy that strategy and win for sure. Therefore,
(at least) the disadvantaged candidate must be mixing. The result extends easily to
larger values of , and is true unless  is suciently large that A can locate at the me-
dian and guarantee a payo of 1. In general, if  <
n
2
  1, then there will be no pure
strategy equilibrium. In what follows, we limit attention to uniform distribution of the
medians, and to strategies that have a particular symmetry property. Specically, each
of the mixed strategy distributions of the candidates are symmetric around
1
2
. Formally:
Denition 1: A strategy for candidate j is symmetric if 
ji
= 
j;n i+1
.
Also, at least in this section, we will limit attention to equilibria in which there are \no
gaps." That is, the support of each candidate's mixed strategy is an interval. Formally:
Denition 2: A strategy for candidate j has no gaps if there exist integers i; k such
that 0  i  k  n and 
jt
> 0 if and only if i  t  k.
We will show below, by construction, the existence of symmetric equilibria with no
gaps, for this case of small . We have not been able to rule out the possibility that there
are mixed equilibria that are asymmetric and/or have gaps.
In the remainder of the paper, we assume there are an even number of locations and 
is uniform, unless specically stated otherwise. The analysis for the odd case is given in
appendix A. In this section we derive the symmetric equilibrium strategies with no gaps
for a xed even value of n, greater than or equal to 8. The equilibrium mixed strategies
for n = 4 and n = 6 are described in section 3.4 as examples.
3.1 Candidate A's payos for each strategy
Given any mixed strategy, 
D
= (
D
1
; : : : ; 
D
n
) for candidate D, we denote by 
A
(x
i
; 
D
)
the probability of winning for candidate A if A chooses location x
i
, i = 1; : : : ; n; where
5
xi
=
i 1
n 1
. These expressions are written below:
8
In general the payos of candidate A for a given strategy i can be written as :
9

A
(x
i
; 
D
) =
P
[
i 1
2
]
j=1
(n  i+ j + 1) 
D
i 2j 1
+
P
[
i 1
2
]
j=1
(n  i+ j + 1)
D
i 2j
+(n  i + 1)
D
i 1
+ n
D
i
+ i
D
i+1
+
P
[
n i
2
]
j=1
(i + j)
D
i+2j
+
P
[
n i
2
]
j=1
(i+ j) 
D
i+2j+1
For example, for i = 3, this reduces to:

A
(x
3
; 
D
) = (n  1) 
D
1
+ (n  2)
D
2
+ n
D
3
+ 3
D
4
+ 4
D
5
+ : : :+

n
2
+ 1


D
n 1
+

n
2
+ 1


D
n
Symmetric equilibria with no gaps are solved by (1) equating the payos of adjacent
locations, and then (2) nding one of the endpoints of the support. If adjacent locations
x
i
and x
i+1
are used with positive probability by candidate A in equilibrium, then their
expected payos (probability of winning) must be equal. For example, if locations 1 and
2 are both in the support of A's mixed strategy, then it must be that:

A
(x
1
; 
D
) = 
A
(x
2
; 
D
) =) 
D
1
+ (1  n) 
D
2
 
n
2
X
i=2

D
2i
= 0
If we denote by k

A
the rst location in the support of A
0
s strategy, then we have a
collection of n  2k

A
+ 1 equations of the form:
k
D
k
+
[
k 1
2
]
X
i=1

D
k 2i
= (n  k)
D
k+1
+
[
n k 1
2
]
X
i=1

D
k+2i+1
for k

A
 k  n  k

A
8
For the case of n < 8, some minor modication is needed.
9
For some values of i in the summation expressions below, subscripts are out of range (e.g., i = 1),
in which case those terms are set equal to 0. The \[x]" notation denotes the greatest integer less than
or equal to x.
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where the partial sums continue up to the point where the subscripts become either less
than 1 or greater than n.
10
If we further assume symmetry, that is, 
D
k
= 
D
n k+1
we obtain the following simple
system of equations that can be solved to obtain the mixing probabilities of D:
(k   1)
D
k
= (n  k) 
D
k+1
+
n
2
X
i=k+2

D
i
for k

A
 k <
n
2
(1)
3.2 Candidate D's payos for each strategy
We derive the equilibrium conditions for candidate D in a similar fashion. Given any
mixed strategy, 
A
= (
A
1
; : : : ; 
A
n
) for candidate A, we denote by 
D
(x
i
; 
A
) the proba-
bility of winning for candidate D if D chooses location x
i
, i = 1; : : : ; n; where x
i
=
i 1
n
.
So, the payos of candidate D for a given strategy i can be written as:
11

D
(x
i
; 
A
) =
P
[
i
2
]
j=1
(n  i + j)
A
i 2j+1
+
P
[
i
2
]
j=1
(n  i + j)
A
i 2j
+
P
[
n i
2
]
j=0
(i + j)
A
i+2j+1
+
P
[
n i
2
]
j=0
(i + j)
A
i+2j+2
Equating candidate D
0
s payos on the support of D
0
s strategy, we obtain a collection
of n  2k

D
+ 1 equations of the form:
k
A
k+1
+
[
k
2
]
X
i=1

A
k 2i+1
= (n  k) 
A
k
+
[
n k
2
]
X
i=1

A
k+2i
for k

D
 k  n  k

D
where the partial sums continue up to the point where the subscripts become either less
than 1 or greater than n.
Imposing symmetry, 
A
k
= 
A
n k+1
we obtain the mixing probabilities of A:
(k   1)
A
k+1
= (n  k) 
A
k
+
n
2
X
i=k+2

A
i
for k

D
 k <
n
2
(2)
10
Note that for low values of n this formula needs to be adjusted at the bounds.
11
For some values of i in the summation expressions below, subscripts are out of range (e.g., i = 1),
in which case those terms are set equal to 0.
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3.3 Equilibrium in symmetric strategies
From the set of equations (1) we obtain the rst proposition about the equilibrium
strategy of candidate D, provided D's mixing probabilities are symmetric around
1
2
, and
there are no \gaps" in candidate A
0
s strategy.
Proposition 2: In any equilibrium with symmetric strategies and no gaps, 
D
k
> 
D
k+1
for 1 6 k <
n
2
and 
D
k
6 
D
k+1
for
n
2
6 k 6 n  1.
Proof : If k 6
n+1
2
then n k > k  1. From expression (1), this immediately implies
that 
D
k
> 
D
k+1
for 1 6 k <
n
2
. 
Proposition 3: In any equilibrium with symmetric strategies and no gaps, 
A
k
6 
A
k+1
for 1 6 k <
n
2
and 
A
k
> 
A
k+1
for
n
2
6 k 6 n  1.
Proof : If k 6
n+1
2
then n k > k  1. From expression (2), this immediately implies
that 
A
k
 
A
k+1
for 1 6 k <
n
2
. 
That is, the disadvantaged candidate's mixing distribution is U -shaped, with the
least probability weight in the center. In contrast, candidate A's mixing distribution
places monotonically decreasing weight on strategies that are further from the median.
Intuitively, the disadvantaged candidate must dierentiate his policy from the advantaged
candidate. Completing the picture, the advantaged candidate locating in the center of the
policy space (in a probabilistic sense), eectively \forces" the disadvantaged candidate
to tend to adopt more extreme positions (again, in a probabilistic sense).
Proposition 4: In any equilibrium with symmetric strategies and no gaps, 
A
k
> 0
only if
n
4
 k 
3n
4
and 
D
k
> 0 only if
n
4
 k 
3n
4
.
Proof : Consider the set of equations (2):
(k   1)
A
k+1
= (n  k)
A
k
+
n
2
X
i=2

A
k+i
for 1 6 k <
n
2
If k 6
n
4
then k   1 6
n
2
  k   1 : in this case we have that the number of p's in the
RHS larger than or equal to p
k+1
(considering that 
A
k
< 
A
k+1
for k <
n
2
) is larger than
the number of 
A
k+1
in the LHS. So these equations cannot be satised by any 
A
> 0.
Therefore, we must have 
D
k
= 0 for k 6
n
4
; and because of symmetry: 
D
k
= 0 for k >
3n
4
.
Now consider equation (1). If k 6
n
4
the LHS is equal to zero and the RHS is positive,
so they cannot hold either. Therefore, we must have 
A
k
= 0 for k 6
n
4
; and because of
symmetry: 
A
k
= 0 for k >
3n
4
. 
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A nal proposition concerns the endpoints of the supports of the mixed strategies, k

A
and k

D
. The main point is that these two endpoints must be very close to each other.
Proposition 5: In any equilibrium with symmetric strategies and no gaps, 
A
k
> 0
only if 
D
k
> 0, and hence k

D
 k

A
. Furthermore, k

A
 k

D
+ 1; so k

D
 k

A
 k

D
+ 1.
Proof : If there are no gaps, clearly the support of A cannot strictly contain the
support of D. A strategy for A that assigns positive probability to a location less than
k

D
can be improved on by a strategy for A that moves all that probability to location
k

D
, but is the same in all other respects. This yields strictly higher expected payos to
A since, by assumption, D is placing some probability on k

D
: Similarly, a strategy for D
that assigns positive probability to a location less than k

A
  1 can be improved on by a
strategy for D that moves all that probability to location k

A
  1, but is the same in all
other respects. This yields strictly higher expected payos to D since, by assumption, A
is placing some probability on k

A
. We cannot rule out D placing positive probability on
k

A
  1. 
3.3.1 Recursive derivation of equilibrium
If we rst consider the equations determining the A mixing probabilities (from the D
indierence equations) in order to nd the mixed strategy equilibrium, we have:
12
(n  k) 
A
k
+
n
2
X
i=2

A
k+i
= (k   1)
A
k+1
for
n
4
< k <
n
2
These equations can be solved recursively to give:

A
n
2
 1
=
n
2
  2
n
2
+ 1

A
n
2

A
n
2
 2
=
 
n
2
  3

n
2
 2
n
2
+1
  1
n
2
+ 2

A
n
2

A
n
2
 3
=
 
n
2
  4

(
n
2
 3
)
n
2
 2
n
2
+1
 1
n
2
+2
 
n
2
 2
n
2
+1
  1
n
2
+ 3

A
n
2
and so forth.
Similarly, if we consider the equations determining the D mixing probabilities (from
the A indierence equations), we have
12
Of course, not all of these equations will necessarily hold, since we may have p
k
= 0 or q
k
= 0 for
some k between
n
4
and
3n
4
. Part of the solution below will involve nding the minimum value of k.
9
(k   1)
D
k
= (n  k)
D
k+1
+
n
2
X
i=2

D
k+i
for
h
n
4
i
< k <
n
2
These are solved recursively in a similar fashion as above, to get:

D
n
2
 1
=
n
2
+ 1
n
2
  2

D
n
2

D
n
2
 2
=
 
n
2
+ 2


n
2
+1
n
2
 2

+ 1
n
2
  3

D
n
2

D
n
2
 3
=
 
n
2
+ 3

(
n
2
+2
)

n
2
+1
n
2
 2

+1
n
2
 3
+

n
2
+1
n
2
 2

+ 1
n
2
  4

D
n
2
and so forth.
Since 
A
and 
D
are probability distributions, we must have:
X
[
n
4
]
<k6
n
2

A
k
=
1
2
X
[
n
4
]
<k6
n
2

D
k
=
1
2

A
k
 0; k = 1; 2; : : : ; n

D
k
 0; k = 1; 2; : : : ; n
Therefore, we can solve the two recursive systems explicitly to get:

A
n
2
=
1
2
 
P
0jj

A
S
A
j
(n)
!
and 
A
n
2
 j
= S
A
j
(n) 
A
n
2
where:
S
A
0
= 1
S
A
1
(n) =
n
2
  2
n
2
+ 1
S
A
j
(n) =
 
n
2
  j

S
A
j 1
(n) 
j 1
P
i=0
S
A
i
(n)
n
2
+ j
10
As j increases S
A
j
(n) may become negative. Let j

denote the largest j for which
S
A
j
(n) is positive. It determines the extreme point of the support of 
A
, denoted by k

which is given by: k

=
n
2
  j

A
where j

= maxfj  1j(
n
2
  j)S
A
j 1
(n)  1 + S
A
1
(n) +
S
A
2
(n) + : : :+ S
A
j 1
(n)g.
A similar solution can be worked out for the 
D
's,

D
n
2
=
1
2
 
P
0ij

D
S
D
i
(n)
!
and 
D
n
2
 j
= S
D
j
(n)
D
n
2
where
S
D
0
= 1
S
D
1
(n) =
n
2
+ 1
n
2
  2
S
D
j
(n) =
 
n
2
+ j

S
D
j 1
(n) +
j 2
P
i=0
S
D
i
(n)
n
2
  j   1
From these recursive equations, we can derive a symmetric equilibrium equilibrium
with no gaps. There is always exactly one equliibrium in which the two candidates mix
over the same support. Sometimes there is a second equilibrium, which is the same for
A, but D mixes over a slightly wider support that includes one additional position to the
right and one additional position to the left. There are no other symmetric equilibria
with no gaps.
Theorem 1: Either there is a unique equilibrium (
A
; 
D
), or there are two equilibria
(
A
; 
D
) and (
A
; 
D0
).
Proof : Consider equation (2)
(n  k) 
A
k
++
n
2
X
i=2

A
k+i
= (k   1)
A
k+1
for
n
4
< k <
n
2
Notice that for all
n
4
< k <
n
2
we can write 
A
k
as a function of 
A
i
with k < i 
n
2
,
that is
11
A
k
=
(k   1)
A
k+1
 
P
n
2
i=2

A
k+i
(n  k)
:
In particular we will have that 
A
n
2
 1
is a function of 
A
n
2
; 
A
n
2
 2
is a function of 
A
n
2
 1
and 
A
n
2
; and substituting 
A
n
2
 1
from the previous result we can also obtain 
A
n
2
 2
as a
function of 
A
n
2
: Following this approach for all 1  j <
n
2
we can write each 
A
n
2
 j
as a
linear function of 
A
n
2
, that is, 
A
n
2
 j
= S
A
j
(n) 
A
n
2
with coecients:
S
A
j
(n) =
 
n
2
  j

S
A
j 1
(n) 
j 1
P
i=0
S
A
i
(n)
n
2
+ j
where S
A
0
= 1:
Observe that these coecients are a decreasing function of j; therefore they are all
less than 1, which implies that the probability that each policy is assigned by candidate
A's strategy decreases as we move away from the center. Furthermore they might turn
negative. Let j

A
denote the last positive coecient. This value denes the support of
candidate A's strategy in equilibrium.
Notice that if S
A
j

A
+1
(n) < 0 candidate A's support will be the set of policies:

x
n
2
 j

; x
n
2
 j

+1
; : : : ; x
n
2
; x
n
2
+1
; : : : ; x
n
2
+j

; x
n
2
+j

+1
	
:
Since S
A
j

+1
(n) < 0 and we set 
A
n
2
 j

 1
= 0 we will have that given the equilibrium
strategies of candidate A, candidate D's payos are: 
D
 
x
n
2
 j

 1
; 
A

< 
D
 
x
n
2
 j

; 
A

,
therefore in equilibrium we must have that 
D
n
2
 j
= 0: for all j > j

:
Similarly, if S
A
j

+1
(n) = 0 and S
A
j

+2
(n) < 0; candidate A's support will be the set
of policies

x
n
2
 j

; x
n
2
 j

+1
; : : : ; x
n
2
; x
n
2
+1
; : : : ; x
n
2
+j

; x
n
2
+j

+1
	
. Since S
A
j

+2
(n) < 0 and
we set 
A
n
2
 j

 2
= 0 we will have that given the equilibrium strategies of candidate A,
candidate D's payos are: 
D
 
x
n
2
 j

 2
; 
A

< 
D
 
x
n
2
 j

 1
; 
A

; therefore in equilibrium
we must have that 
D
n
2
 j
= 0 for all j > j

+ 1.
When we substitute 
A
n
2
 j
= S
A
j
(n)
A
n
2
for all j such that S
A
j
(n) is positive in the
constrain that probabilities have to add up to one (because we assumed symmetry this
constrain actually implies
j

P
j=0

A
n
2
 j
=
1
2
), we obtain a unique value for 
A
n
2
, that is

A
n
2
=
1
2
 
P
0ij

S
A
i
(n)
!
:
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Substituting this value into the equations 
A
n
2
 j
= S
A
j
(n) 
A
n
2
for all 1  j  j

we obtain
a unique symmetric probability distribution that solves the constraints of candidate D,
thus it denes the mixed strategy of candidate A.
Similarly, we can use equation (1) to write 
D
k
as a function of 
D
i
with k < i 
n
2
,
that is

D
k
=
(n  k) 
D
k+1
+
P
n
2
i=2

D
k+i
(k   1)
As before for all 1  k <
n
2
we can write each 
D
n
2
 j
as a linear function of 
D
n
2
, that is,

D
n
2
 j
= S
D
j
(n)
D
n
2
with coecients:
S
D
j
(n) =
 
n
2
+ j

S
D
j 1
(n) +
j 2
P
i=0
S
D
i
(n)
n
2
  j   1
where S
D
0
= 1:
Observe that these coecients are an increasing function of j; therefore they are all
larger than 1, which implies that the probability that each policy is assigned by candidate
D's strategy increases as we move away from the center. From before we know that since

A
n
2
 j

is the last positive strategy for candidate A; we must have that the support of
candidate D's strategy must be contained in either

x
n
2
 j

; x
n
2
 j

+1
; : : : ; x
n
2
; x
n
2
+1
; : : : ; x
n
2
+j

; x
n
2
+j

+1
	
if S
A
j

+1
(n) < 0 or

x
n
2
 j

 1
; x
n
2
 j

; x
n
2
 j

+1
; : : : ; x
n
2
; x
n
2
+1
; : : : ; x
n
2
+j

; x
n
2
+j

+1
; x
n
2
+j

+2
	
if S
A
j

+1
(n) = 0.
When we substitute 
D
n
2
 j
= S
D
j
(n) 
D
n
2
for all j such that x
n
2
 j
is in the support in the
constrain that probabilities have to add up to one (because of symmetry this constrain
implies
j

P
j=0

D
n
2
 j
=
1
2
or
j

+1
P
j=0

D
n
2
 j
=
1
2
) , we obtain a unique value for 
D
n
2
, that is, either

D
n
2
=
1
2
 
P
0ij

S
D
i
(n)
!
or 
D
n
2
=
1
2
 
P
0ij

+1
S
D
i
(n)
!
.
Substituting this value into the equations 
D
n
2
 j
= S
D
j
(n) 
D
n
2
for all 1  j  j

or
1  j  j

+ 1 we obtain in each case a unique symmetric probability distribution that
solves the constraints of candidate A, thus it denes the equilibrium mixed strategy of
candidate D. 
This result does not rule out other equilibria which are either asymmetric or have
gaps. We conjecture that for small  there are no equilibria with gaps.
13
3.4 Examples
Since the derivation above only applies to the case of n > 8 we computed directly the
solutions for smaller odd values of n. These are given in the table below.
13
We also show
the two symmetric equilibria with no gaps for the case of n = 10, since it illustrates that
the support of candidate A's mixed strategy can be strictly smaller than the support of
candidate B's mixed strategy.
n 
A

D
4 0,1/2,1/2,0 0,1/2,1/2,0
6 0,1/10,2/5,2/5,1/10,0 0,2/5,1/10,1/10,2/5,0
8 0,0,1/7,5/14,5/14,1/7,0,0 0,0,5/14,1/7,1/7,5/14,0,0
10 0,0,0,1/6,1/3,1/3,1/6,0,0,0 0,0,15/42,2/21,1/21,1/21,2/21,15/42,0,0
10 0,0,0,1/6,1/3,1/3,1/6,0,0,0 0,0,0,1/3,1/6,1/6,1/3,0,0,0
4 Properties of equilibrium for n!1
4.1 Limiting properties of expected payos
A natural question to ask is \How big an advantage does A enjoy over B, in equilib-
rium?" In any mixed strategy equilibrium, all pure strategies in the support yield the
same expected payo. Therefore, to answer this question, we evaluate the equilibrium
probabilities of winning for each of the two candidates, when they locate at
n
2
. Recall
that for all n > 1, both candidates mix with positive probability at
n
2
. That is, 
D
n
2
> 0
and 
A
n
2
> 0: Also, since this is a constant sum game, if there are any other equilibria (in-
cluding asymmetric equilibria and/or equilibria with gaps), all such equilibria will yield
the same expected payo.
From equation (1), with n locations the equilibrium expected payos for A if strategy
n
2
is used, denoted 
A
n
are:

A
n
=
1
2
+

D
n
2
2
+
1
n
k

X
i=1
(i+ 1) 
D
n
2
 i
: (3)
Similarly, from equation (2), with n locations the equilibrium expected payos for D
if strategy
n
2
is used are:

D
n
=
1
2
 

A
n
2
2
+
1
n
k

X
i=1
i
A
n
2
 i
: (4)
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For n odd, see the derivations in the appendix.
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This immediate delivers the following theorem, which states that the candidate with an
a priori advantage is the more likely candidate to win.
Theorem 2: 
A
n
>
1
2
> 
D
n
for all even n = 1; 2; : : :.
Proof : Since 
D
n
2
> 0 and 
D
i
 0; this implies that 
A
=
1
2
+

D
n
2
2
+
1
n
k

P
i=1
(i+ 1) 
D
n
2
 i
>
1
2
. Since 
A
+
D
= 1, this implies that 
D
<
1
2
.
Referring to the examples in Table 1, one can directly verify these formulas for small
values of n. For example, 
A
4
=
3
4
and 
A
6
=
41
60
. However, notice that 
n
A
is not monoton-
ically decreasing in n. Thus it is not clear how the size of the advantage to A changes
as n changes. Thus, we next address the question: What is lim
n!1
f
A
n
g? This is an
interesting question, since if we let n get very large, we approach the standard Downsian
model in which candidates locate on the [0; 1] continuum. Furthermore, as we take this
limit the advantage to A is innitesimal, since we are assuming  <
1
n 1
. The following
theorem proves that the advantage disappears in the limit. One can interpret this as
an upper hemicontinuity result of equilibrium payos; as we let the magnitude of A's
advantage () go to 0.
Theorem 3: lim
n!1
f
A
n
g =
1
2
.
Proof : In the proof we only consider limits of sequences of even values of n: A
similar proof applies for the odd case. The expression on the RHS of (3) has three terms.
What we prove is that the second and the third terms each converges to 0 in n, which
leaves only the rst term, implying that lim
n!1
f
D
n
g =
1
2
and hence lim
n!1
f
A
n
g =
1
2
.
To show that the second term converges to 0 requires proving that lim
n!1
f
A
n
2
g = 0.
Recall that, by construction, 
A
n
2
=
1
2
0
@
P
0ij

A
+1
S
A
i
(n)
1
A
: Therefore, we need to show that
P
0ij

A
+1
S
A
i
(n) increases without bound as n gets large. We do this by proving inductively
that lim
n!1
S
A
i
(n) = 1 for all i. First, observe that S
A
0
(n) = 1 for all n, and S
A
1
(n) =
n
2
+1
n
2
 2
! 1. Under the induction hypothesis, let i be any integer greater than 1 and suppose
that S
A
k
(n) ! 1 for all k < i. We just need to show that this implies S
A
i
(n) ! 1. By
equation
S
A
i
(n) =
 
n
2
  i

S
A
i 1
(n) 
i 1
P
k=0
S
A
k
(n)
n
2
+ i
The right hand side converges to S
A
i 1
(n), which by hypothesis converges to 1. Hence
lim
n!1
S
A
i
(n) = 1. Therefore, we have established that lim
n!1
f
A
n
2
g = 0: Finally, we
have to show that the third term of equation (3),
1
n
k

P
i=1
i
A
n
2
 i
, converges to 0. Summing
15
equations (3) and (4), gives us

A
n
+
D
n
=
"
1
2
+

D
n
2
2
+
1
n
k

X
i=1
(i + 1)
D
n
2
 i
#
+
"
1
2
 

A
n
2
2
+
1
n
k

X
i=1
i
A
n
2
 i
#
= 1 +

D
n
2
 

A
n
2
2
+
1
n
k

X
i=1
f(i+ 1) 
D
n
2
 i
+ i
A
n
2
 i
g
From above, 
A
n
2
! 0. The same inductive argument
14
can be used to show 
D
n
2
! 0;
so the second term,

D
n
2
 

A
n
2
2
vanishes, leaving:

A
n
+
D
n
! 1 +
1
n
k

X
i=1
f(i + 1)
D
n
2
 i
+ i
A
n
2
 i
g
However, by denition, 
A
n
+
D
n
= 1 for all n. Therefore,
1
n
k

P
i=1
f(i+ 1) 
D
n
2
 i
+i
A
n
2
 i
g !
0. Since 
D
n
2
 i
and 
A
n
2
 i
are both nonnegative for all i, this implies that both
1
n
k

P
i=1
i
A
n
2
 i
and
k

P
i=1
(i + 1)
D
n
2
 i
converge to 0.
This establishes that lim
n!1
f
D
n
g =
1
2
and therefore lim
n!1
f
A
n
g =
1
2
. 
4.2 Limiting properties of the mixed strategy support
We can show that the proportion of locations that are used with positive probability in
equilibrium goes to zero in n.
Theorem 4: lim
n!1
k

(n)=n =
1
2
.
Proof :To simplify the proof we go directly to the limit where the policy space is the
[0; 1] interval, and the n=2 location corresponds to 1=2 and  is arbitrarily small.
15
By
denition, lim
n!1
k

(n)=n 
1
2
. Suppose that lim inf
n!1
k

(n)=n <
1
2
. Then, in the
limiting case we are considering, this means that there is a subsequence such that the
(common) support of the two candidates' equilibrium strategies along this subsequence
converges to 1=2   ". We now show that this cannot be an equilibrium. Consider the
14
This also follows directly, since we already showed earlier that 0 < 
D
n
2
< 
A
n
2
.
15
That is, voters will vote for the closest candidate unless they are equidistant, in which case they will
vote for A.
16
strategy for candidate A that places all weight on 1=2 while candidate D uses some u-
shaped strategy 
D
1
with support on [1=2  "; 1=2+ "]. Then, by symmetry, the expected
payo to A is

A
1
= 2
Z
1=2+"
1=2
1=2 + t
2

D
1
(t)dt
= 1=4 +
Z
1=2+"
1=2
t
D
1
(t)dt
 1=4 + 1=4 + "=4
> 1=2
which contradicts the result in the previous section. 
This, together with the previous result about expected payos implies that the solu-
tion converges to the standard median voter result. Candidates' policies converge to the
median and each candidate expects to win half the time.
5 Extensions
In this section, we look at three extensions of the model. The results of the previous
sections were derived assuming that the A's advantage was small. That is, voters closer to
D than to A always vote forD, so the quality advantage enjoyed by A only came into play
when a voter was equidistant from A and D. The rst extension relaxes the assumption
that the distribution of median voter's ideal point is uniform. The second extension we
consider retains the assumption of a nite policy space, but considers what happens if
 is slightly larger, so that some voters will vote for A over D, even if D is closer. The
third extension relaxes the assumption of a nite policy space, also considering the case
of larger , but where the policy space is the [0; 1] interval.
5.1 Non-uniform distribution of voters
5.1.1 Voters in three positions
Let n = 3, so there are 3 possible locations, a; b or c; where a; b; c 2 R and a < b < c.
The probability the median voter is located at ideal point in a is denoted by , similarly
the probabilities she is located at ideal points b or c are denoted by  and  respectively,
with +  +  = 1: Suppose that the utility functions of the voters are as the described
in the previous sections, and assume that 0 <  < max fa  b; b  cg.
The payos for the game played by the parties appear in the table below:
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a b c
a 1; 0 ; 1    + ; 1    
b 1  ;  1; 0  + ; 1    
c 1  ;  1    ;  +  1; 0
where A is the row player and D is the column player. For any mixed strategy by D,
denoted 
D
, A's expected payos for the three possible pure strategies are:

A
 
a; 
D

= 
D
a
+ 
D
b
+ ( + )
D
c

A
 
b; 
D

= (1  )
D
a
+ 
D
b
+ ( + )
D
c

A
 
c; 
D

= (1  )
D
a
+ (1    )
D
b
+ 
D
c
To solve for a totally mixed strategy equilibrium we equating these payos we obtain:

A
 
a; 
D

= 
A
 
b; 
D

=) 
D
a
+ (  1)
D
b
= 0

A
 
b; 
D

= 
A
 
c; 
D

=) ( + )
D
b
+ ( +    1)
D
c
= 0
Solving for 
D
gives:

D
a
=
(1  )  (1  ) (+ )
1  (1  ) (+ )
; 
D
b=
   ( + )
1  (1  ) ( + )
; 
D
c=
 ( + )
1  (1  ) ( + )
Solving for 
A
in a similar way gives:

A
a
=
( + )
2
  
1  (1  ) ( + )
; 
A
b=
(1  ) ( + )  
2
1  (1  ) ( + )
; 
A
c=
(1  )  
1  (1  ) ( + )
:
The symmetric case,  = , is natural special case to consider. With symmetry,
 = 1  2, so we obtain:

A
a
=

2  
; 
A
b
=
2  3
2  

D
a
=
1  
2  
; 
D
b
=

2  
Since  6
1
2
this implies that 
A
a
6 
A
b
and 
D
a
> 
D
b
. In other words, the advantaged
candidate places more weight in the central location than does the disadvantaged candi-
date. Furthermore, the comparative statics are interesting. As one would expect,
@
A
a
@
> 0
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so that as the electorate becomes more dispersed the advantaged candidate moves away
from the central location. Less intuitive is the result that
@
D
a
@
< 0; implying that the
disadvantaged candidate moves toward the center as it becomes less likely the median is
located in the center. At the extreme case, when  =
1
2
(i.e. zero probability that the
median is in the center), both candidates mix uniformly over the three locations. In this
case, D wins 1=3 of the time. At the opposite extreme, as  approaches 0, A places all
probability at 1=2 and D places all probability at the extremes. The probability that D
wins, converges to 0.
5.1.2 Voters in four positions
Consider the previous model with four positions, a < b < c < r; with median voter
probabilities given by , , , and , respectively. And consider the symmetric case in
which  = ;  = ; and + =
1
2
: The reduced form game played by the parties in this
case is:
a b c r
a 1,0 ; 1  
1
2
;
1
2
1
2
;
1
2
b 1  ;  1,0
1
2
;
1
2
1  ; 
c 1  ; 
1
2
;
1
2
1,0 1  ; 
r
1
2
;
1
2
1
2
;
1
2
; 1   1,0
In this case we obtain the following probabilities:

A
a
= max

2 
1
2
2+ 1
; 0


A
b
= min

1  
2+ 1
;
1
2


D
a
= min

1  
2+ 1
;
1
2


D
b
= max

2 
1
2
2+ 1
; 0

Thus, the results are similar to the 3 location case. As before, since  6
1
2
; we have

A
a
6 
A
b
and 
D
a
> 
D
b
and
@
A
a
@
> 0,
@
D
a
@
< 0. Notice that if  <
1
4
, we have 
A
a
=
0; 
A
b
=
1
2
; q
D
a
=
1
2
; 
D
b
= 0; so the advantaged candidate places all weight in the two
central locations, while the disadvantaged candidate places all weight at the extremes.
5.2 Larger  : 1 < (n  1) < 2
Next we consider the case candidate A wins not only when the median voter is equidistant
or closer to A than to D, but also A wins if D is closer to the median voter by only
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1=(n   1). That is, 1 < (n   1) < 2. It turns out that in this case there are gaps in
the mixed strategy distribution, asymmetries, and non-monotonicities, which makes it
dicult to derive a solution using the same algorithm as above.
The payos of candidate A for a given strategy i can be written as:

A
(x
i
; 
D
) = : : :+ (n  i+ 3)
D
i 4
+ (n  i + 3)
D
i 3
+ (n  i+ 2) 
D
i 2
+ n
D
i 1
+n
D
i
+ n
D
i+1
+ (i + 1)
D
i+2
+ (i+ 2) 
D
i+3
+ (i+ 2)
D
i+4
+ : : :
The payos of candidate D for a given strategy i can be written as:

D
(x
i
; 
A
) = : : :+ (n  i+ 2) 
A
i 4
+ (n  i + 1)
A
i 3
+ (n  i+ 1) 
A
i 2
+ (i)
A
i+2
+(i)
A
i+3
+ (i + 1)
A
i+4
+ (i+ 1) 
A
i+5
+ : : :
To check if we can use our recursive method of equating payos from adjacent strate-
gies, we used the Gambit (1999) game solver software to compute the equilibrium of the
game, for a range of low values of n. The results are reported in the table below, which
demonstrates that there are gaps in the equilibrium strategy of D. We do not know
whether there can be gaps in the equilibrium strategy of A: There are other peculiarities
that are troubling, and suggest that our methods for the case of small  will be dicult
to apply. For example, the equilibrium is not necessarily symmetric, in which case there
exist equilibria in pairs, which are mirror images of each other. Also, to obtain limiting
result that are dierent from the results for small , we would have to consider values of
 that increase as n increases. Otherwise, for example if we require 1 < (n  1) < 2 for
all n,  will be driven to 0 in the limit, so we will eectively be back in the small  case.
Thus, we also computed some examples for higher ranges of  and nd that the gaps
proliferate as  increases. Because of these kinds of problems, we are unable to obtain a
general solution for the large  case with a large nite number of locations.
n 
A

D
3 0,1,0 1,0,0
4 1/4,1/4,1/2,0 1/2,0,0,1/2
5 0,1/3,1/3,1/3,0 2/3,0,0,1/3,0
6 0,1/3,1/6,1/6,1/3,0 0,1/2,0,0,1/2,0
7 0,1/7,2/7,1/7,2/7,1/7,0 3/7,0,1/7,0,0,3/7,0
8 0,0,2/5,1/15,2/15,2/5,0,0 0,4/15,0,1/5,0,0,8/15,0
10 0,0,.13,.18,.18,.18,.18,.13,0,0 0,.31,.13,0,.05,.05,0,.13,.31,0
12 0,0,0,.19,.10,.20,.20,.10,.19,0,0,0 0,0,.26,.15,0,.07,.07,0,.15,.26,0,0
24 . . . ,0,.009,.08,.05,.07,.17,.10,.10,.17,.07,. . . . . . 0,.20,.13,.01,.05,.04,0,.03,.03,0,.04,. . .
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5.3 Continuous locations
The approach in the rest of this paper was to study a model with a nite number of
feasible locations, and a small advantage. The ndings above, for larger , suggest that a
dierent approach may be required to get further results. A natural alternative approach
is the continuous location model, where the policy space, }, consists of all points in
the [0; 1] interval. As before, suppose that the median voter is uncertain, and the prior
beliefs of the candidates over the location of the median voter are uniform on [0; 1]; and
candidates maximize the probability of winning. The proof of Theorem 1, that pure
strategy equilibria fail to exist unless  = 0; still applies.
While a mixed strategy equilibrium is guaranteed with nite locations, a mixed strat-
egy equilibrium is not necessarily guaranteed to exist by the standard theorem for games
with continuous payos (Glicksburg 1952), since the payo function is discontinuous.
The problem is related to the kind of discontinuity that arises in a game studied by Sion
and Wolfe (1957), and later by Dasgupta and Maskin (1986). In this game, however, the
discontinuities satisfy the technical condition of weak lower semi-continuity, as well as
upper hemi-continuity of the sum of payos, and payo discontinuities are restricted to
a special (small) subset of strategy proles. Therefore, we can appeal directly to The-
orem 5 of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, p. 14) to establish existence of mixed strategy
equilibrium in this game.
Theorem 5: Let } = [0; 1] and  > 0. A Nash equilibrium point exists in mixed
strategies.
Proof : See Appendix B.
The theorem can be proved under much less stringent assumptions. For example, the
proof given in the appendix is easily adapted to allow for non-uniform distributions with
continuous, strictly increasing CDF's. Preferences do not have to be \tent" preferences,
and need not even be Euclidean, provided they are single peaked. One could also allow
for heterogeneity of  across voters, but at considerable cost of notation.
6 Conclusions
This paper has taken a rst step toward solving for the mixed strategy equilibrium of
a simple game between two candidates, in one dimension where one of the candidates
has an advantage, and candidates only care about electoral success.
16
Because of payo
discontinuities in the continuous location formulation of the problem, we look at equilib-
rium in a discrete policy space. We nd that the advantaged candidate will locate more
16
As explained before, one can view this either as a model either of vote maximizing candidates in a
world where the locations of voters are common knowledge, or a model where candidates maximize the
probability of winning with uncertainty about the location of the median voter.
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centrally than the disadvantaged candidate, and always has an equilibrium advantage,
i.e., A wins with probability greater than :5. However, if we look at the limiting case
where the advantage becomes arbitrarily small (and the discrete grid on the policy space
becomes arbitrarily ne), we obtain a payo continuity result, i.e., in the limit A and D
each win with probability :5. Examples suggest that these results may generalize to non-
uniform distributions. For the case a coarse grid of strategies, we obtain some intuitive
comparative statics results with symmetric non-uniform distributions. In particular, we
nd that as the distribution of the median voter becomes more certain, the equilibrium
advantage of A increases. And, as we know from Ansolabehere and Snyder (2000), in
the limit A wins with probability 1, when there is no uncertainty. In the other direction,
when the variance of the distribution of the median voter is maximal, D has a fair chance
(1=3) of winning.
We also prove existence of equilibrium for the continuous location problem, for ar-
bitrary values of . A natural next step, is to solve for the mixed equilibrium in the
continuous location setting.
There are some interesting possibilities for embedding this model of candidate ad-
vantages into more complex and realistic models of campaigns. For example, Wittman
(2000) has shown how one can include factors such as endorsements to signal quality
to the voter. One can also look at the eects of campaign spending and advertising
campaigns to aect voter beliefs about candidate quality. This would add a stage at the
beginning of the game we studied here, in which candidates can choose spending levels,
and the advantage of candidate A will then depend on the spending levels of the two
candidates. This would, in eect, endogenize , which we assumed here to be exoge-
nous. Such an extension would result in a combination of the spending game approach of
Erikson and Palfrey (2000) with the asymmetric competition approach presented here.
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7 Appendix A: n odd
We will show by construction the existence of symmetric equilibria with no gaps for the
case of small  when the policy space } consists of an odd number of locations n > 7 and
 is uniform. We also show that for large n the equilibrium strategies approach the ones
found for the case when n is even.
As before, symmetric equilibria with no gaps are solved by rst equating the payos
of adjacent locations, and then nding one of the endpoints of the support.
If we denote by k

A
the rst location in the support of A
0
s strategy, then we have a
collection of n  2k

A
+ 1 equations of the form:
k
D
k
+
[
k 1
2
]
X
i=1

D
k 2i
= (n  k)
D
k+1
+
[
n k 1
2
]
X
i=1

D
k+2i+1
for k

A
 k  n  k

A
where the partial sums continue up to the point where the subscripts become either less
than 1 or greater than n.
If we further assume symmetry, that is, 
D
k
= 
D
n k+1
we obtain the following system
of equations that can be solved to obtain the mixing probabilities 
D
:

n+ 1
2
  j   1


D
n+1
2
+j
=

n+ 1
2
+ j   1


D
n+1
2
+j 1
+ 
D
n+1
2
+
j 2
X
i=0

D
n+1
2
+i
+ ( 1)
j
 
H
D
o
 H
D
e

for 0  j 
n+1
2
; where
H
D
o
=
[
n+1
4
]
X
i=1

D
n+1
2
+2i 1
H
D
e
=
[
n 1
4
]
X
i=1

D
n+1
2
+2i
Similarly, equating candidate D
0
s payos on the support of D
0
s strategy, we obtain
a collection of n  2k

D
+ 1 equations of the form:
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k
A
k+1
+
[
k
2
]
X
i=1

A
k 2i+1
= (n  k)
A
k
+
[
n k
2
]
X
i=1

A
k+2i
for k

D
 k  n k

D
, where the partial sums continue up to the point where the subscripts
become either less than 1 or greater than n.
Imposing symmetry, 
A
k
= 
A
n k+1
we obtain the mixing probabilities of A:

n+ 1
2
+ j   1


A
n+1
2
+j
=

n + 1
2
  j   1


A
n+1
2
+j 1
 
j 2
X
i=1

A
n+1
2
+i
+ ( 1)
j
 
H
A
o
 H
A
e

for 0  j  j


n+1
2
where
H
A
o
=
[
n+1
4
]
X
i=1

A
n+1
2
+2i 1
H
A
e
=
[
n 1
4
]
X
i=1

A
n+1
2
+2i
These equations can also be solved recursively as in the even case to get the mixing
probabilities of candidate D:

D
n+1
2
+1
=
n+1
2

D
n+1
2
 
 
H
D
o
 H
D
e

n+1
2
  2

D
n+1
2
+2
=
 
n+1
2
+ 1


D
n+1
2
+1
+
 
H
D
o
 H
D
e

n+1
2
  3

D
n+1
2
+3
=

D
n+1
2
+ 
D
n+1
2
+1
+
 
n+1
2
+ 2


D
n+1
2
+2
 
 
H
D
o
 H
D
e

n+1
2
  4
: : :
and so forth.
And the mixing probabilities of candidate A:

A
n+1
2
+1
=
 
n+1
2
  1


A
n+1
2
 
 
H
A
o
 H
A
e

n+1
2
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A
n+1
2
+2
=
 
A
n+1
2
+
 
n+1
2
  3


A
n+1
2
+1
+
 
H
A
o
 H
A
e

n+1
2
+ 1

A
n+1
2
+3
=
 
A
n+1
2
+1
+
 
n+1
2
  4


A
n+1
2
+2
 
 
H
A
o
 H
A
e

n+1
2
+ 2
: : :
and so forth.
Thus, we can write the probabilities that dene the mixed strategy of candidate A as

A
n+1
2
+j
= 
j

A
n+1
2
+ 
j
 
H
A
o
 H
A
e

where 
0
= 1; 
1
=
n+1
2
 1
n+1
2
, and for 1 < j <
n+1
2

j
=
 
n+1
2
  j   1


j 1
 
j 2
P
i=0

i
n+1
2
+ j   1
if j > 1 is even
=
 
n+1
2
  j   1


j 1
 
j 2
P
i=1

i
n+1
2
+ j   1
if j > 1 is odd
and 
0
= 0; 
1
=
 1
n+1
2
; and for 1 < j <
n+1
2

j
=
 
n+1
2
  j   1


j 1
+ ( 1)
j
 
j 2
P
i=1

i
n+1
2
+ j   1
And we can write the probabilities that dene the mixed strategy of candidate D as

D
n+1
2
+j
= '
j

D
n+1
2
+  
j
 
H
D
o
 H
D
e

where '
0
= 1; '
1
=
n+1
2
n+1
2
 2
, and for 1 < j <
n+1
2
'
j
=
 
n+1
2
+ j   1

'
j 1
+
j 2
P
i=0
'
i
n+1
2
  j   1
if j > 1is odd
=
 
n+1
2
+ j   1

'
j 1
+
j 2
P
i=1
'
i
n+1
2
  j   1
if j > 1is even
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And  
0
= 0;  
1
=  
1
n+1
2
 2
; and for 1 < j <
n+1
2
 
j
=
 
n+1
2
+ j   1

 
j 1
+ ( 1)
j
+
j 2
P
i=1
 
i
n+1
2
  j   1
Since
H
A
o
 H
A
e
=
[
n+1
4
]
X
i=1

A
n+1
2
+2i 1
 
[
n 1
4
]
X
i=1

A
n+1
2
+2i
and using the expressions above, we obtain that
H
A
o
 H
A
e
=
[
n
2
]
P
i=1
( 1)
i+1

i
1 
[
n
2
]
P
i=1
( 1)
i+1

i

A
n+1
2
Now we can substitute this into the previous expressions for the 
A
's and obtain that
for 1 6 j <
n+1
2

A
n+1
2
+j
=
2
6
6
6
4

j
  
j
[
n
2
]
P
i=1
( 1)
i

i
1 +
[
n
2
]
P
i=1
( 1)
i

i
3
7
7
7
5

A
n+1
2
Similarly, since
H
D
o
 H
D
e
=
[
n+1
4
]
X
i=1

D
n+1
2
+2i 1
 
[
n 1
4
]
X
i=1

D
n+1
2
+2i
and using the expressions above, we obtain that
H
D
o
 H
D
e
=
[
n
2
]
P
i=1
( 1)
i+1
'
i
1 
[
n
2
]
P
i=1
( 1)
i+1
 
i

D
n+1
2
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Now we can substitute this into the previous expressions for the 
D
's and obtain that
for 0 6 j <
n+1
2

D
n+1
2
+j
=
2
6
6
6
4
'
j
   
j
[
n
2
]
P
i=1
( 1)
i
'
i
1 +
[
n
2
]
P
i=1
( 1)
i
 
i
3
7
7
7
5

D
n+1
2
Since 
A
and 
D
are probability distributions we must have

A
n+1
2
+ 2
[
n
2
]
X
i=1

DA
i
= 1

D
n+1
2
+ 2
[
n
2
]
X
i=1

D
i
= 1

A
k
 0; k = 1; 2; : : : ; n

D
k
 0; k = 1; 2; : : : ; n
As in the even case we denote by k

=
n+1
2
  j

the extreme of the support for 
A
,
that is the rst strategy with positive probability. j

is determined by:
j

= max
8
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
j > 1 : 
j
 
j
j
P
i=1
( 1)
i

i
1 +
j
P
i=1
( 1)
i

i
9
>
>
=
>
>
>
;
Therefore, we can solve the two recursive systems explicitly to obtain the following
probabilities: for candidate A:

A
n+1
2
=
1
1 + 2
j

P
j=1
2
4

j
  
j
j

P
i=1
( 1)
i
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
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i
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j
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P
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i

i
3
7
7
7
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
A
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2
for 1  j  j

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and, since the limits of the support of candidate D are determined by the k

found above,
we have that for candidate D:

D
n+1
2
=
1
1 + 2
j

P
j=1
2
4
'
j
   
j
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
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i
'
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
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for 1  j  j
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2
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2
6
6
6
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   
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'
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
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7
7
7
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D
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for 1  j  j

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7.1 Equilibrium in symmetric strategies
Proposition 6: In any equilibrium with symmetric strategies and no gaps,
if k 6
n+1
3
then 
D
k
> 
D
k+1
if k 6
n+1
2
then 
D
k
> 
D
k+2
and
if k 
2(n+1)
3
then 
D
k
 
D
k+1
if k 
n+1
2
then 
D
k
 
D
k+2
Proof : If we equate the payos that candidate A obtains from strategies k and k+2
we obtain the following set of equations:
k
D
k
+
k 1
X
i=1

D
k i
= (n  2k   1)
D
k+1
+ (n  k   1) 
D
k+2
+
n k
X
i=3

D
k+i
28
for 1 6 k 6 n  2
and if we assume symmetry we can it write it as:
(k   1)
D
k
= (n  2k) 
D
k+1
+ (n  k) 
D
k+2
+ 2
n 1
2
X
i=3

D
k+i
+ 
D
n+1
2
for 1 6 k <
n+1
2
  1: And for k =
n+1
2
we have

n + 1
2


D
n+1
2
+ 3
D
n+1
2
=

n + 1
2
  3


D
n+1
2
+2
For k =
n+1
2
  1 we obtain an identity.
If k 6
n+1
2
then n   k > k   1. From the above equation, this immediately implies
that 
D
k
> 
D
k+2
. Similarly if k 6
n+1
3
then n   2k > k   1. From the above equation,
this immediately implies that 
D
k
> 
D
k+1
. The other two results can be obtained by
symmetry. 
Proposition 7: In any equilibrium with symmetric strategies and no gaps,
if k <
n+1
3
then 
A
k
6 
A
k+1
if k <
n+1
2
then 
A
k
6 
A
k+2
and
if k >
2(n+1)
3
then 
A
k
 
A
k+1
if k >
n+1
2
then 
A
k
 
A
k+2
Proof : If we equate the payos that candidate D obtains from strategies k and k+2
we obtain the following set of equations:
: : :+ 
A
k 2
+ 
A
k 1
+ k
A
k+2
= (n  k   1)
A
k
+ (n  2k   1)
A
k+1
+ 
A
k+3
+ 
A
k+4
+ : : :
k
A
k+2
+
k 1
X
i=1

A
k i
= (n  k   1)
A
k+2
+ (n  2k   1) 
A
k+1
+
n k
X
i=3

A
k+i
for 1 6 k 6 n  2
If we assume symmetry we can write them as
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k
A
k+2
= (n  k   1)
A
k
+ (n  2k   1)
A
k+1
+ 2
n 1
2
X
i=3

A
k+i
+ 
A
n+1
2
for 1 6 k <
n+1
2
  1. And for k =
n+1
2
we have that

n+ 1
2
+ 1


A
n+1
2
+2
=

n + 1
2
  2


A
n+1
2
  3
A
n+1
2
+1
For k =
n+1
2
  1 we obtain an identity.
If k <
n+1
2
then n   k   1 > k. From the above equation, this immediately implies
that 
A
k
 
A
k+2
. Similarly if k <
n+1
3
then n  2k  1 > k. From the above equation, this
immediately implies that 
A
k
 
A
k+1
. The other two results can be obtained by symmetry.

That is, the disadvantaged candidate's mixing distribution is almost U -shaped, with
the least probability weight in the center, and increasing probability in every other strat-
egy as they move away from the center. In contrast, candidate A's mixing distribution
places monotonically decreasing weight on every other strategy that is further from the
median. Even though in all our examples the disadvantaged candidate's distribution is
U -shaped, in general it could produce a shape of two parallel U -shaped distributions since
we can only show that the probabilities decrease every other location when approaching
the center of the interval. Similarly, in the examples we nd that the distribution of
the advantaged candidate is monotone at each side of the center of the interval, but in
general we can only prove an approximation of it.
7.2 Equilibrium for n  7
Since the derivation above only applies to the case of n > 7 we computed directly the
solutions for smaller odd values of n. These are given in the table below.
n 
A

D
3 1/5,3/5,1/5 2/5,1/5,2/5
5 0,1/4,1/2,1/4,0 0,3/8,1/4,3/8,0
7 0,1/64,17/64,7/16,17/64,1/64,0 0,3/8,1/8,0,1/8,3/8,0
7.3 Convergence to the even case
We will show that as n becomes large, the mixing distribution found in the last section
approach the ones found for the case when n is even. We prove two lemmas, and the
result follows directly from them.
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Lemma 1: lim
n!1

j
= 0 and lim
n!1
 
j
= 0
Proof : We will show it by induction. Since 
0
= 0 and 
1
=
 1
n+1
2
; we have that
lim
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1
= 0. Now suppose that lim
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Similarly, we have that  
0
= 0 and  
1
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2
 2
: Therefore, lim
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Thus, the role of
 
H
A
o
 H
A
e

and
 
H
D
o
 H
D
e

in determining the probabilities 
A
and 
D
respectively, decreases as n gets large. On the other hand:
Lemma 2: lim
n!1

j
= 1 and lim
n!1
'
j
= 1
Proof :
We will show it by induction. Since 
0
= 1 and 
1
=
n+1
2
 1
n+1
2
, we have that lim
n!1

1
=
1. Now suppose that lim
n!1

j
= 1 for all j < j
0
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  1
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0
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and
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j
0
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n!1
 
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2
  j
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  1


j
0
 1
 
j
0
 2
P
i=1

i
n+1
2
+ j
0
  1
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0
is odd
Similarly, we have that '
0
= 1 and '
1
=
n+1
2
n+1
2
 2
. Therefore, lim
n!1
'
1
= 1. Now
suppose that lim
n!1
'
j
= 1 for all j < j
0
. In that case we also have that
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= 1 if j
0
is odd
and
lim
n!1
'
j
0
= lim
n!1
 
n+1
2
+ j
0
  1

'
j
0
 1
+
j
0
 2
P
i=1
'
i
n+1
2
  j
0
  1
= 1 if j
0
is even:
Suppose that n is even and consider the equilibrium strategies corresponding to

A
(n) ; 
D
(n) ; 
A
(n+ 1) and 
D
(n+ 1). Given the previous results we have that
lim
n!1

A
(n)  
A
(n + 1) = lim
n!1

D
(n)  
D
(n + 1) = 0
since
lim
n!1

A
n
2
(n)  
A
n+2
2
(n + 1) =
lim
n!1
1
1+2
0
@
P
1jj

A
S
A
j
(n)
1
A
 
1
1+2
j

P
j=1
2
6
6
4

j
(n+1) 
j
(n+1)
j

P
i=1
( 1)
i

i
(n+1)
1+
j

P
i=1
( 1)
i

i
(n+1)
3
7
7
5
= 0
and
lim
n!1

D
n
2
(n)  
D
n+2
2
(n + 1) =
lim
n!1
1
1+2
0
@
P
1ij

D
S
D
i
(n)
1
A
 
1
1+2
j

P
j=1
2
6
6
4
'
j
(n+1)  
j
(n+1)
j

P
i=1
( 1)
i
'
i
(n+1)
1+
j

P
i=1
( 1)
i
 
i
(n+1)
3
7
7
5
= 0
Since for all n we have that

A
n+1
2
+j
= 
j
(n) 
A
n+1
2
+ 
j
(n)
 
H
A
o
(n) H
A
e
(n)


D
n+1
2
+j
= '
j
(n) 
D
n+1
2
+  
j
(n)
 
H
D
o
(n) H
D
e
(n)

and
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A
n
2
 j
= S
A
j
(n) 
A
n
2

D
n
2
 j
= S
D
j
(n) 
A
n
2
we also have that
lim
n!1

A
n
2
+j
  
A
n+2
2
+j
=
lim
n!1
S
A
j
(n) 
A
n
2
  
j
(n+ 1) 
A
n+2
2
  
j
(n+ 1)
 
H
A
o
(n+ 1) H
A
e
(n+ 1)

= 0
and
lim
n!1

D
n
2
+j
  
D
n+2
2
+j
=
lim
n!1
S
D
j
(n) 
D
n
2
  '
j
(n + 1)
D
n+2
2
   
j
(n + 1)
 
H
D
o
(n+ 1) H
D
e
(n+ 1)

= 0
Therefore the equilibrium probabilities 
A
and 
D
found for the case when n is odd
approach the values found for the case when n is even.
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8 Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 5: Existence of
equilibrium with continuous locations.
First, we observe that if  
1
2
then there are many pure strategy equilibria, where A
locates suciently close to
1
2
, D locates anywhere, and A wins with probability 1. When
 <
1
2
it is straightforward to show that no pure strategy equilibrium exists, since, for
every location A chooses, there exists a response by D than gives D a strictly positive
payo, but for any location D might choose, A can match D, which leaves D with a 0
payo. Hence there is no minimax point in pure strategies if  <
1
2
.
The main theorem of Dasgupta and Maskin (1986, p. 14) states:
Let [(S
i
; U
i
) ; i = 1; : : : ; N ] be a game. Let S
i
 R
1
(i = 1; : : : ; N) be a closed interval
and let U
i
: S ! R
1
(i = 1; : : : ; N) be continuous except on a subset S

(i) of S

(i),
where S

(i) is dened by
S

(i)=

(s
1
; : : : ; s
N
) 2 S : 9j 6= i; 9d; 1  d  (i) such that s
j
= f
d
ij
(s
i
)
	
where (i) is a positive integer and for each integer d, with 1  d  (i) , and
f
d
ij
: R
1
! R
1
is a one-to-one, continuous function. Suppose
P
N
i=1
U
i
(s) is upper semi-
continuous and U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
) is bounded and weakly lower semi-continuous in s
i
. Then the
game [(S
i
; U
i
) ; i = 1; : : : ; N ] possesses a mixed-strategy equilibrium.
To prove Theorem 5 for the case of  <
1
2
we show that the conditions of the Dasgupta-
Maskin theorem are satised. When we apply this theorem to our case we have:
1. S
i
= } = [0; 1] for i = A;D; is a closed interval.
2. 
A
(x
A
; x
B
) and 
B
(x
A
; x
B
) are continuous except on a set of measure zero. We
may take  (A) =  (D) = 2; f
1
A;D
(x
A
) = x
A
  , and f
2
A;D
(x
A
) = x
A
+ . In our
case S

(A) = S

(D), the union of two 45 degree lines.
3. 
A
(x
A
; x
D
) + 
D
(x
D
; x
A
) = 1, which is a constant function so
P
N
i=1
U
i
(s) is upper
semi-continuous.
4. 0  
i
(x
A
; x
D
)  1 and therefore U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
) is bounded for each player.
5. The proof that 
i
(x
A
; x
D
) is weakly lower semi-continuous in x
i
for i = A;D
requires several few steps, which are given below. The denition of weak lower
semi-continuity is:
Denition 3: U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
) is weakly lower semi-continuous in s
i
if 8s
i
2 S

i
(i),
9 2 [0; 1] such that 8s
 i
2 S

 i
(s
i
),
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 lim inf
s
i
!
 
s
i
U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
) + (1  ) lim inf
s
i
!
+
s
i
U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
)  U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
).
First consider 
A
(x
A
; x
D
), and let x
D
be xed. We treat ve separate cases:
Case 1A x
D
2 (; 1  ). In this case there are two discontinuities, one at x
A
= x
D
  
and the other at x
A
= x
D
+ . For any x
A
strictly between these two discontinuity
points, 
A
(x
A
; x
D
) = 1. At the rst discontinuity point, 
A
(x
D
  ; x
D
) =
1+x
D
2
,
lim inf
x
A
!
 
x
D
 

A
(x
A
; x
D
) = x
D
; and lim inf
x
A
!
+
x
D
 

A
(x
A
; x
D
) = 1. Thus we
can take any  
1
2
and satisfy the required inequality:
x
D
+ (1  )  1 
1 + x
D
2
Similarly, at the second discontinuity point, 
A
(x
D
+ ; x
D
) =
2 x
D
2
, lim inf
x
A
!
 
x
D
+

A
(x
A
; x
D
) = 1; and lim inf
x
A
!
+
x
D
+

A
(x
A
; x
D
) = (1  x
D
). Thus we can take
any  
1
2
and satisfy the required inequality:
  1 + (1  ) (1  x
D
) 
2  x
D
2
Case 2A x
D
2 (0; ). In this case there is one discontinuity, at x
A
= x
D
+ : For any
x
A
< x
D
+ , 
A
(x
A
; x
D
) = 1. At the discontinuity point, 
A
(x
D
+ ; x
D
) =
2 x
D
2
,
lim inf
x
A
!
 
x
D
+

A
(x
A
; x
D
) = 1, and lim inf
x
A
!
+
x
D
+

A
(x
A
; x
D
) = (1  x
D
). Thus
we can take any  
1
2
and satisfy the required inequality:
  1 + (1  ) (1  x
D
) 
2  x
D
2
Case 3A x
D
2 (1 ; 1). In this case there is one discontinuity, at x
A
= x
D
 . For any
x
A
> x
D
  , 
A
(x
A
; x
D
) = 1. At the discontinuity point, 
A
(x
D
+ ; x
D
) =
1+x
D
2
,
lim inf
x
A
!
 
x
D
 

A
(x
A
; x
D
) = x
D
, and lim inf
x
A
!
+
x
D
 

A
(x
A
; x
D
) = 1. Thus we
can take any  
1
2
and satisfy the required inequality:
x
D
+   1 
1 + x
D
2
Case 4A x
D
= 1  . In this case there are two discontinuities, with one at x
A
= x
D
  
and the other at the right boundary, x
A
= 1. The rst discontinuity can be dealt
with as in Case 3. For the second discontinuity, the denition of weak lower semi-
continuity requires that lim inf
s
i
!
 
s
i
U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
)  U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
). This is satised since
lim inf
x
A
!
 
1

A
(x
A
; 1  ) = 1 and 
A
(1; 1  ) =
1+
2
 1.
Case 5A x
D
= . In this case there are two discontinuities, with one at x
A
= x
D
+ 
and the other at the left boundary, x
A
= 0. The rst discontinuity can be dealt
with as in Case 2. For the second discontinuity, the denition of weak lower semi-
continuity requires that lim inf
s
i
!
+
s
i
U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
)  U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
). This is satised since
lim inf
x
A
!
+
0

A
(x
A
; ) = 1 and 
A
(0; ) =
1+
2
 1.
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Now consider 
D
(x
D
; x
A
), and let x
A
be xed. Again, we treat ve separate cases:
Case 1D x
A
2 (; 1  ). In this case there are two discontinuities, one at x
D
= x
A
  
and the other at x
D
= x
A
+ . For any x
D
strictly between these two discontinuity
points, 
D
(x
A
; x
D
) = 0. At the rst discontinuity point, 
D
(x
A
; x
A
  ) =
x
A
 
2
,
lim inf
x
D
!
 
x
A
 

D
(x
A
; x
D
) = x
A
  , and lim inf
x
D
!
+
x
A
 

D
(x
A
; x
D
) = 0. Thus
we can take any  
1
2
and satisfy the required inequality:
(x
A
  ) + (1  )  0 
x
A
  
2
Similarly, at the second discontinuity point, 
D
(x
A
; x
A
+ ) =
1 (x
A
+)
2
,
lim inf
x
D
!
 
x
A
+

D
(x
A
; x
D
) = 0; and lim inf
x
D
!
+
x
A
 

D
(x
A
; x
D
) = 1   (x
A
+ ).
Thus we can take any  
1
2
and satisfy the required inequality:
  0 + (1  ) (1  (x
A
+ )) 
1  (x
A
+ )
2
Case 2D x
A
2 (0; ). In this case there is one discontinuity, at x
D
= x
A
+ . For
any x
D
< x
A
+ , 
D
(x
A
; x
D
) = 0. At the discontinuity point, 
D
(x
A
; x
A
+ ) =
1 (x
A
+)
2
, lim inf
x
D
!
 
x
A
+

D
(x
A
; x
D
) = 0; and lim inf
x
D
!
+
x
A
+

D
(x
A
; x
D
) = 1  
(x
A
+ ). Thus we can take any  
1
2
and satisfy the required inequality:
  0 + (1  )(1  (x
A
+ )) 
1  (x
A
+ )
2
Case 3D x
A
2 (1  ; 1). In this case there is one discontinuity, at x
D
= x
A
  : For any
x
D
> x
A
  , 
D
(x
A
; x
D
) = 0. At the discontinuity point, 
D
(x
A
; x
A
+ ) =
x
A
 
2
,
lim inf
x
D
!
 
x
A
+

D
(x
A
; x
D
) = x
A
  ; and lim inf
x
D
!
+
x
A
+

D
(x
A
; x
D
) = 0. Thus
we can take any  
1
2
and satisfy the required inequality:
(x
A
  ) + (1  )  0 
x
A
  
2
Case 4D x
A
= 1  . In this case there are two discontinuities, with one at x
D
= x
A
  
and the other at the right boundary, x
D
= 1: The rst discontinuity can be dealt
with as in Case 3. For the second discontinuity, the denition of weak lower semi-
continuity requires that lim inf
s
i
!
 
s
i
U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
)  U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
). This is satised since
lim inf
x
D
!
 
1

D
(1  ; x
D
) = 0 and 
A
(1  ; 1) = 0  0.
Case 5D x
A
= . In this case there are two discontinuities, with one at x
D
= x
A
+ 
and the other at the left boundary, x
D
= 0. The rst discontinuity can be dealt
with as in Case 2. For the second discontinuity, the denition of weak lower semi-
continuity requires that lim inf
s
i
!
+
s
i
U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
)  U
i
(s
i
; s
 i
). This is satised since
lim inf
x
A
!
+
0

D
(; x
D
) = 0 and 
A
(; 0) = 0  0.
Thus, 
i
(x
A
; x
D
) is weakly lower semi-continuous in x
i
for i = A;D: Therefore, our
game possesses a mixed-strategy equilibrium. 
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